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THE PATENTEE'S DILEMMA-IS PRICE FIXING LEGAL?
THOMAS A. THOMAS

*

The patent laws and the anti-trust laws were enacted in pursuance of
Constitutional authority and professedly to advance the welfare of the nation.
The area between the two is extremely narrow and the courts have been
faced with the difficult problem of construing them together-giving full
force and effect to each. The process has resulted in a series of inconsistent
decisions' which clearly reflect the lack of proper guideposts for a comprehensive approach to the problem. The fault cannot be attributed entirely to the
courts, for the source of difficulty lies in the lack of sufficient legislative determination of the nature of the patent grant. It is, therefore, the purpose
of this article to reveal the difficulties and inconsistencies existing in our
patent laws today with the view to reflect the legislative shortcomings through
an analysis of the cases involving patents and price fixing arrangements.
The Constitution2 empowers Congress ". . To promote the Progress of

Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
This provision was originally implemented in 1790 by statute which has been
amended on numerous occasions to provide that every patent shall contain
.. . a grant to the patentee, his heirs and assigns for the term of seventeen
years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery." 3 It is not the right to make, use or vend a patented article which
is derived from the patent law for that right existed prior to its passage. Rather,
its purpose was designed to protect the patentee from the effects of disclosure
existing at the common law' by securing to him the exclusive right to make,
use or vend the patented article and to prevent others from doing so without
his consent.9 Thus, the narrow and limited monopoly conferred upon a patentee
has been defined as consisting ".

..

altogether in the right to exclude every-

one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee." 6 The exclusive right is the equivalent of the
right to restrain others from manufacturing and using the article which the
patentee has invented. t
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. See, TNEC Monograph 31 (1941); TNEC Monograph 38 (1941) 74-83.
2. U.S. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 8.
3. Rsv. STAT. § 4884 (1875) ; 35 U.S.C. § 40 (1946) ; 46 Stat. 376 (1930) ; 35 U.S.C.
40 (1946).
4. At common law the inventor had a valueless right since the exclusive right to
the patent was destroyed by publication.
5. Bloomer v. McQuenan, 14 How. 539, 549 (1852).
6. Id. at 545.
7. Continental Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908).
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With the passage of the Sherman Act s in 1890, efforts were made to
distinguish the patent monopoly from the monopoly condemned by the Act.
This was believed necessary in order to give force and effect to the patent
laws since the Sherman Act contained no mention of the patent grant and by
its terms condemned every monopoly or attempt to monopolize. Thus it was
declared that the patents ". . . are not in the usual sense, the subjects of
monopoly," 9 since ". . . a patent is that which brings out from the realm of
the mind something which never existed before, and gives it to the country." 10
But the monopoly of the anti-trust laws, so the argument went, is the restraint
of trade or commerce in articles which had formerly been the subject of trade
or commerce. The fallacy of this argument was soon recognized; however, it
served and still serves to support the statement that the passage of the Sherman
Act and the uncertainty of the nature of the patent grant made it inevitable
that confusion develop. Through a series of decisions involving the patentanti-trust relationship, the courts were forced to acknowledge that the patent
is in a very substantial sense a monopoly excepted, however, from the operation
of the anti-trust laws. Thus, it has been declared, "A peculiarity of the rights
of the owner of a patent, as distinguished from other property, is this: Each
has the right to sell that which is his, but the owner of the patent has the
exclusive right to sell his patented article. This is, in a very substantial sense,
a monopoly. It must be, however, that the monopoly here meant is not
the monopoly condemned by the Act of 1890." 11 Since the exclusive right of
the patentee to the use and enjoyment of his invention is excepted from the
operation of the anti-trust laws, various arrangements have been devised by
patentees in order to secure the stability and security normally incident to
price fixing. The legality of these price fixing schemes is dependent upon the
extent of the patent monopoly, the uncertainty of which constitutes the basis
for the confusion in our patent law cases today.
Despite the fact that the prime purpose of our patent law is to secure to
the public the benefit of scientific achievement by guaranteeing to the patentee,
as an inducement, the exclusive enjoyment of his invention for seventeen
years,1 2 there has emerged the doctrine of "non use" of patents. "If the patent
is valid the owner can, of course, prohibit entirely the manufacture, sale or
use of . . ."the device made pursuant to the patent. 13 In the first case 14 in
8.26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 1 et seq. (1946).
9. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 142 Fed. 531, 537
(C.C.D. Wis. 1906).
10. Singer v. Walmsley, 22 Fed. Cas. 207, No. 12,900 (C.C.D. Md. 1860).
It,United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800, 804 (E.D. Pa. 1915).

12. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corporation, 289 U.S. 178 (1933) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
13. Carbice Corporation v. American Patents Development Corporation, 283 U.S. 27.
31 (1931) ; See also, United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897).
14. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908)
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which the doctrine was announced, the Supreme Court rejected the argument

based on the purpose of the patent grant and considered the patent as a
property right which the owner could have kept entirely to himself. Since the
suppression of patents and the promotion of science and the useful arts is a
contradiction of terms, the doctrine of "non use" has permitted the self interest
of patentees to come into the ascendency and the much abused public interest
becomes of secondary importance.
The right of the patentee to withhold the patented article completely
gave rise to the concept that the patentee was justified in imposing conditions
upon the use of the patented article. The fact that an article is patented was
formerly regarded as having the effect to enable the patentee to impose, by
notice accompanying the goods, a restriction as to the resale price which would
accompany them into the hands of ultimate consumers.' 5
If a subsequent purchaser knowingly violated the restriction, he became liable
as a contributory infringer. Thus, in Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufman,'6 in
upholding a resale price restriction imposed in a "jobber's agreement" on
phonographs, the court declared, "I cannot doubt that the complainants have
the right to sell their patented phonographs with the restrictions and upon the
conditions contained in their "jobber's agreement," and that dealers buying
the patented instruments from the jobbers with notice of those restrictions and
conditions are bound thereby." 17 Although the case was decided after the
passage of the Sherman Act no mention of that act was made. The patentee,
while acting within his domain, was regarded as czar. The people had the option of either taking the invention on the terms he dictated or leaving it alone
for the seventeen year period of exclusion. Cries of restraint of trade and of
impairment of the freedom of sales were regarded as unavailing, for the
Constitution and statutes granting the patent right were interpreted as conveying a complete monopoly excepted from the operation of the anti-trust
laws.' 8
The theory of this holding was based strictly upon an economic approach
with no attempt to regard the relationship of the patent monopoly to the
monopoly and restraint of trade condemned by the anti-trust laws. The patent
was regarded as a property right which belonged exclusively to the patentee,
and since the true test of violation of the Sherman Act was whether the
people were injured by being deprived of something to which they were
15. Winchester Repeating Arms Co. v. Olmsted, 203 Fed. 493 (7th Cir. 1913);

The Fair Y. Dover Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 117 (7th Cir. 1908) ; Edison Phonograph Co. v.
Pike, 116 Fed. 863 (C.C.D. Mass. 1902); Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufman, 105 Fed.

960 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901).
16. 105 Fed. 960 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901).
17. Ibid.
18. Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 154 Fed. 365 (7th Cir.
1907); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir.
1907); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907); Victor
Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (7th Cir. 1906).
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entitled,' 0 how could the patentee's control of prices of articles to which the
people had no right be said to cause injury? 20 The fact that price restrictions
imposed upon patented articles deprived the public of competition which the
Sherman Act was designed to promote was of no avail for the courts concluded
that the exclusive nature of the patent grant negatived any right in the public

to free competition in articles covered by patents. 2 ' This holding was the
palliative for the practice of accumulating and suppressing patents. It subscribed to the inference that a practice proper in the case of one patent
continued to be proper though applied to more than one. Thus, where a
manufacturer of straw stackers acquired all patents on such articles and
licensed all manufacturers of threshing machines to make, use or vend the
patented articles on condition that the resale price was to be established by
the licensor, the license agreements were held legal.22
The first case to reach the Supreme Court in which the exercise of patent
rights was challenged under the Sherman Act was Bempnt v. National Harrow
Co."3 The owner of a patent licensed certain manufacturers to use the patent
under specified restrictions including a stipulation that the licensees should
sell the articles only at a fixed price. The defendant licensee violated the
conditions and the plaintiff brought suit for patent infringement. In sustaining
the action, the Court held that the Federal Anti-Trust Law did not refer to
that kind of a restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable
and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the
owner restricting the terms upon which the article may be used and the price
to be demanded. With reference to the price stipulation, the Court announced,
"The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would sell the
article manufactured under the license was also an appropriate and reasonable
condition. It tended to keep up the price of the implements manufactured and
sold, but that was only recognizing the nature of the property dealt in, and
providing for its value so far as possible. This the parties were legally entitled to
do. The owner of a patent may assign it, or sell the right to manufacture and
sell the article patented, upon the condition that the assignee shall charge a
certain amount for such article." 24
Although the Bentent case constituted a precedent for departtng from
the holding that the anti-trust laws did not apply to rights granted under a
valid patent, it created a great deal of doubt by adopting the uncertain and
indefinite test of reasonableness. If the condition or restriction imposed by the
19. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

20. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358, 363
(7th Cir. 1907).
21. Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 154 Fed. 365 (7th Cir.
1907).
22. Ibid.
23. 186 U.S, 70 (1902).
24. Id. at 93.
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patentee upon the assignee or licensee is reasonable, it does not come within
the condemnation of the anti-trust laws. Although the Bement case involved
the legality of a price restriction upon the intangible right to manufacture according to a patented process, it was not long before it was cited as authority
for upholding restrictions upon the use of the patented article itself.
In Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.2' the plaintiff sold mimeograph machines,
upon which it had a valid patent, with the restriction that the machines be
used only with a certain kind of unpatented ink which the plaintiff manufactured. Such a restriction would be advantageous to the patentee since by
dictating the sole source of supply for unpatented materials used with the
patented machine, he could establish an exclusive market in articles not
protected by a legal monopoly. The defendant, with knowledge of this restriction, sold to S a different kind of ink aware that it was to be used in the patented
mimeograph machine manufactured by the plaintiff. The lower court enjoined
the activities of the defendant, and on appeal it was assumed by the Supreme
Court that the Bement case sanctioned price restrictions attached to a patented
article. Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Court, declared, "If the stipulation
in an agreement between patentees and dealers in patented articles, which
among other things, fixed a price below which the patented articles should not
be sold, would be a reasonable and valid condition, it must follow that any
other reasonable stipulation, not inherently violative of some substantive law,
imposed by a patentee as a part of a sale of a patented machine, would be
equally valid and enforceable." 20
The uncertainty of the Bement case was not only evidenced by its
extension to justify price restrictions imposed on patented articles, but was also
apparent in cases involving the legality of price restrictions imposed on unpatented articles manufactured under secret process. In John D. Park & Sons
v. Hartman21 an attempt was made to set up a distinction between articles
manufactured under a secret process and ordinary articles-the argument
being that the former are more nearly analogous to patented articles and come
within the then existing rule allowing price restrictions on patented articles.
This argument was not novel, for by this time it had contributed considerably
to the confusion resulting from the uncertainty of the Bement holding. In
Park & Sons Co. v. National Druggist's Association 21 the plaintiff referred
to the proprietary article in question as a patent medicine. The court assumed
that it was in fact patented and upheld a price maintenance scheme under what
it considered to be the Bement doctrine. Other courts, unaware of the error,
supposed from this case that there was a peculiar rule which was applicable to
articles manufactured under secret process.2 9 The confusion was recognized by
25. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
26. Id. at 31.

27. 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
28. 175 N.Y. I, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Justice Lurton in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartnan80 and the distinction
was definitely rejected by the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park
& Sons Co.' 1 Thus, within a 10 year period after the Bement case was decided,
price restrictions imposed on unpatented articles manufactured by a secret
process and conditions as to the resale price of patented articles were upheld.
The former was sanctioned as a result of an error and a maze of uncertainty
regarding the extent of the Bement holding and the latter derived its legality
through a misinterpretation of the Bement doctrine.
The general impression that the patent laws authorized price restrictions
on the sale of patented articles was in effect overthrown in Bauer v. O'Donnell.32 In that case the Supreme Court held invalid and beyond the scope of
the patent monopoly a restriction appearing on packages containing a patented
article and providing: "Licensed by us for sale and use at a price not less than
$1." The use of the word "license" was clearly an attempt to simulate the
facts presented in the Benient case, for the patented articles were sold by the
patentee and the notice appearing on the packages was an obvious attempt to
regulate the resale price. In other words, an attempt to camouflage the real
transaction was made. In denouncing the arrangement, the decision was
limited to the holding that a patentee who sells his patented article exhausts
his patent monopoly and any attempt to regulate the resale price is invalid.
The case did not hold that the price restriction was contrary to the Sherman
Act. In fact, the argument was still possible that thd policy of the patent laws
being in favor of monopoly would serve to take the patented articles out of the
condemnation of the Anti-Trust Law. However, since the Court held that
the sale of the patented article exhausts the patent monopoly, the query is
raised-what about the Dick case? It is to be remembered the Supreme Court
held in that case that a condition requiring the use of unpatented materials with
a patented mimeograph machine is valid and enforceable even though it was
to take effect after the sale of the patented machine to which it was attached. Is
there any logical distinction? The Court thought so by -declaring that the
arrangement in the Dick case was legal since it was a limitation on the use of
the patented article only, whereas the restriction imposed in the Bauer case
presented an attempt to control the resale price of the patented article. This
distinction was obviously falacious since the condition imposed on the mimeograph machines in the Dick case was to take effect after the sale of the machine
by the patentee. If the patent monopoly is exhausted by the sale of the patented
article to invalidate a condition as to resale price maintenance it must certainly
29. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jayne Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1906):
Wells & Richardson Co. v. Abraham, 146 Fed. 190 (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1906).
30. See note 27 supra.
31. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
32. 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
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have a similar effect upon any other condition to take effect subsequent to the
sale. The practice of distinguishing facts which warrant the application of a
similar legal principal was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 3 and the Dick
case was specifically overruled. The Court held that the owner of a patent may
not restrict its use by a purchaser, by a notice attached to a machine embodying
the patent, to specific materials necessary to its operation which were not a
part of the patented machine. The plaintiff, owner of a patent on a mechanism
used in motion picture exhibiting machines, granted to X the right to manufacture and sell machines embodying the invention on conditions that the
minimum resale price was to be established by the plaintiff and that all
machines sold should be used solely for exhibiting motion pictures owned
and patented by the plaintiff. X further agreed to attach a notice to each
machine stating the condition as to the use attached to the sale. X sold one
of the machines to Y who in turn leased it to Z. After the patent on the film,
the use of which constituted the condition, had expired Z commenced using
film manufactured by the defendant. In an action for patent infringement, the
plaintiff relied upon the Dick case which was squarely in point. In denying
the relief sought, the Court declared, "It is obvious that the conclusions arrived
at in this opinion are such that the decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co ...
must be regarded as overruled." 34 The same result could have been accomplished under statutory authority, for with the Dick case freshly in mind,
Congress enacted the Clayton Act, s 5 the pertinent section of which provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented
or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale . . . or fix a price charged
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee
therefore ....
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,. . . of a competitor...
where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce.8 8
The Court considered it unnecessary to decide the case under the Clayton
Act but referred to it only as an expression of the public policy confirming the
conclusion reached. The exclusive right granted by the patent was considered
as limited to the invention and could not be extended to permit restrictions on
its use to materials not a part of the patented article.
At this stage in the process of ascertaining the nature of the patent
monopoly certain legal principles became crystallized. First, it became settled
that a patentee cannot, by virtue of his statutory monopoly, impose conditions
33.
34.
35.
36.

243 U.S. 502 (1917).
Id. at 518.
38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended; IS U.S.C 1 12 et seq. (1946).
1 3.
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as to the resale price so as to render one who fails to abide by them a contributory infringer of the patent.37 Second, although a patentee is authorized
to withhold his patented machine from public use, if he sells it, the article passes
beyond the limits of the statutory monopoly; and in considering the validity
of a contractual restraint as to the resale price at which the article is to be
sold, the case is to be considered under the general law and as if there were no
patent.38 Third, the exclusive use secured by a patent means ".... the use of the
invention as it is described in the claims of patent, and not as it may be expanded by limitations as to materials and supplies necessary to the operation of
it ... "30 Fourth, there is a distinction between the sale of the patented
articles themselves and an assignment of the right to produce and vend such
articles. While the former is prohibited under the anti-trust laws, the owner
of a patent is authorized, under the patent grant, to assign the right to manufacture and sell the patented article upon the condition that the assignee will
sell the article at prices fixed by the patentee.4 0 What is the justification for
this distinction? It is said to be warranted by the patent laws which merely
secure to the inventor "the exclusive right" to his invention for a period of
seventeen years. This right confers the power to exclude others and nothing
more. There is no language in the patent laws which permits the patentee to
fix the price at which the patented articles are to be sold by his assignees, nor
is there any prohibition against the practice of a patentee of fixing the resale
price at which the patented articles are to be resold. With respect to the
anti-trust laws, no such distinction is sanctioned and every combination in
restraint of trade is regarded as unlawful.
Suppose a patentee, who is engaged in interstate commerce, requires
a licensee to join other licensees in a combination or pool to control prices and
output of the patented article. Would such an arrangement constitute a violation of the anti-trust laws? That such a combination, in the absence of a patent,
would have the effect of restraining commerce was early settled. "The aim
and result of every price fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of
one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonable or not,
involves power to control the market and fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.
...Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be
in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints .... ",41 True, the Sherman
37. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Cor-

poration v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United Shoe Machine Corporation v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490
(1917) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
38. Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918) ; Waltham
Watch Co. v. Keene, 202 Fed. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aff'd, 209 Fed. 1007 (2d Cir. 1913).

39. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515 (1917).
40. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).

41. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 158 (1940); see also,

United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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Act makes no mention of the patent laws, but it was passed subsequent to their
enactment and embraces "every combination" within its terms. The wording
of the patent and anti-trust laws, when considered together, would indicate
such a combination was not clothed under the protection of the patent grant
and was therefore illegal. Certainly, a combination to fix prices is much more
than the exclusive right granted by the patent laws to make, use or vend the
invention.
That identical case was presented in Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee
Rubber Works Co.42 The plaintiff was the owner of a patent on rubber tires
and licensed eighteen companies to make, use and sell the patented article for
a period of one year. Under the terms of the license agreement, the licensees
were required to sell the patented tires at prices established by the plaintiff
and agreed to pay specified royalties for the right to make, use and vend the
patented article. The defendant licensee refused to pay the specified royalties
contending that the arrangement was in violation of the Sherman Act. In
denouncing this contention, the court declared, "If the plaintiff were the sole
maker of Grant tires, how could the plaintiff's control of prices and output
injure the people, deprive them of something to which they have no right ?" 43
The true test of violation of the Sherman Act, reasoned the court, is whether
the people are deprived of something to which they are entitled. That same
test is also applicable with equal force to uphold control of the resale price of
the patented article by the patentee and yet the courts refuse to apply it to
such cases.

Since price fixing results in security and stability by constituting one of
the most important inducements for the abandonment of competition, it was
natural that the ingenuity of man would be utilized to conceive elaborate
devices in order to extend the very narrow limits of the patent monopoly. This
process was facilitated by the Supreme Court's adherence to the Bement
doctrine and arrangements were fast to develop simulating the facts presented
in the Bement case. In many instances important deviations were accomplished
and the arrangements upheld-clearly reflecting the uncertainty of the Bement
doctrine which constitutes the basis for the animadversion of our patent laws
today.
In United States v. General Electric Co.4" an important extension of the
Bement holding was made. The defendant was the owner of three patents
covering the manufacture, use and sale of electric light bulbs with tungsten
filaments. For the purpose of effectuating its plan of distribution, the defendant
designated others as agents. The contracts of agency provided that the defendant was to maintain a stock of the patented lamps on consignment in the
42. 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir. 1907), cert. granted 207 U.S. 589 (1907)
in 210 U.S. 439 (1907).
43. Id. at 363.

44. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).

but dismissed
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custody of the agent, that the agent would keep records and accounts of all
transactions with the defendant, that the agent would sell the bulbs only at
prices established by the defendant and that title to the bulbs remained in the
defendant until sold by the agent. The number of agents established was large
and included small retailers as well as large wholesalers. The defendant also
licensed Westinghouse, a large company, to manufacture and sell the patented
bulb upon the condition that the selling price and terms of sale were to be
dictated by the defendant. The government contended that both arrangements
violated the Sherman Act-first, because the agency Arrangement was a mere
camouflage since it was very large and included small retailers as well as large
wholesalers. Second, the license agreement with Westinghouse permitted that
company to follow the same conditions of sale as those observed by the defendant. In answer to the first contention, the Supreme Court concluded that
a genuine agency relation was established. In reply to the second government
contention, the Court replied in effect, so what! "As long as he (patentee)
makes no effort to fasten upon ownership of the articles he sells control of the
prices at which his purchaser shall sell, it makes no difference how widespread
his monopoly. It is only when he adopts a combination with others by which
he steps out of the scope of his patent rights and seeks to control and restrain
those to whom he has sold his patented articles in their subsequent disposition
of what is theirs, that he comes within the operation of the Anti-Trust Act." 46
Although the arrangement with Westinghouse constituted a combination
controlling 93% of the entire output of bulbs, the Court was careful to
distinguish it from the combination condemned in Standard Sanitary MJg. Co.
v. United States.46 In that case a number of manufactures, one of whom was
the owner of a patent covering enamelware, entered into an agreement according to the terms of which each agreed to accept a license to make the patented

articles and to sell them in interstate commerce only to jobbers who would
agree to sell at the prices fixed by the combination. In holding the combination
violative of the Sherman Act, the Court stated in effect that the agreements
transcended what was essential to the use of the patent and accomplished a
restraint of trade. The patent monopoly could not be utilized to sanction such
an arrangement since the sale of the patented article terminated the right of
the patentee to impose conditions. With respect to the nature of the Sherman
Act, it was stated, "the Sherman law is a limitation of rights, rights which may
be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained." 47 When applied to
the General Electric case, this statement immediately raises the query-isn't
the right to license the manufacture and sale of a patented article "pushed to
evil consequences" when it results in a combination consisting of 93% of the
45. Id. at 485.
46. 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
47. Id. at 49.
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entire output in the United States and the selling price is established by the
patentee? Obviously the Court thought not and in holding the arrangement
within the patent monopoly subscribed to the Bement doctrine for justification.
Although there was a contention in the Bement case that the contract involved
was a part of a combination, that fact was not established and the Court treated
the case as one between the parties before it-the one granting and the other
receiving the right to use a patent with the price maintenance condition. Thus
the General Electric case became a new leader as a precedent to justify price
fixing agreements entered into between licensor and licensee of a patent.
Suppose X, an owner of a valid patent, licenses others to manufacture and
sell the patented article on condition that it be used for a specified purpose
only and the licensee breaches the condition and sells the article to Y, a vendee
who has knowledge of the facts. Would Y be held liable as an infringer? According to the settled rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Motion Pictore
Patents v. Universal Filn Co. 48 when a patentee sells his patented product, it
is no longer within the limits of the patent monopoly. Under this doctrine,
the fact that both vendor and purchaser had knowledge that the article was
purchased for use outside the field authorized by the patentee was regarded as
immaterial. 49 Would the result be changed because of the presence of an intervening licensee? The Supreme Court in General Talking Picture Corporation
v. Western Electric Co.5o answered in the affirmative. In that case, the
plaintiff was the owner of an invention embodied in an amplifier. It licensed
the defendant to manufacture and sell the patented article only for use in
radio amateur reception, radio experimental reception and in radio broadcast
reception. The defendant, in breach of the license agreement, manufactured the
amplifiers for use in theatres as a part of a talking picture equipment and sold
them to Y for that commercial use. In holding the defendant liable, the Court
subscribed to the reasoning formerly expounded in the Bement case-a patentee
may impose reasonable and legal conditions upon his licensee. In this respect,
the only difference from the facts presented in the Bement case was that here
the restriction was to the use rather than to the selling price. This difference
was immaterial since it was settled earlier that "the statutory authority to grant
the exclusive right to 'use' a patented machine ...is precisely the same as
the authority to grant the exclusive right to 'vend' . . .,,."
In holding Y
liable-as an infringer, the Court reasoned that since Y knew of the condition
and breach by the defendant, he was in no better position than if he had manufactured the patented amplifier itself without a license. What about the
settled doctrine announced in the Motion Picture case that the sale of a
48. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
49. Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893).
50. 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
51. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 56
(1917).
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patented article removes it beyond the control of the patentee? Mr. Justice
Black raised the same question in his dissenting opinion; however, it remains
unanswered.
Since the General Electric case decided that a patentee has the right to
impose price restriction on any and all of his licensees regardless of the size of
the arrangement, does it follow that a patentee can bind himself to an agreement to impose identical restrictions on the licensee's competitors? The
Supreme Court was faced with that precise problem in a case involving copyrights; however, the Court made as its basic premise the assumption that the
rule regarding patent licenses and price fixing would apply with equal force to
a license under a copyright. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States 52 suit
was brought ty the United States to enjoin the defendants from continuing
a conspiracy and from enforcing certain contracts as violative of the Sherman
Act. The defendant, a large group of moving picture exhibitors, demanded
that the moving picture distributors (owners of the copyrights on the moving
pictures shown in the defendant's theatres) agree that in distributing moving
pictures in other theatres, they would require that admission prices be at least
25 cents. The defendant, as a group, constituted one licensee of the distributor's
copyrighted film and required the agreement as a condition of its continued
exhibition of the distributor's first run films in its own theatres at a price of
40 cents or more. The lower court held as a matter of law that each separate
agreement between the defendant and a distributor (copyright owner) requiring the distributor to impose the restrictions on all other theatres was a
violation of the Sherman Act. The defendant appealed on the ground that the
separate contracts entered into with the individual distributors were within
the protection of the copyright monopoly and hence excepted from the condemnation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice
Stone, held that even conceding the right of each copyright holder to impose
restrictions on its licensee, it had no right to contract with the defendant as
to the imposition of those restrictions with the purpose and effect of restraining the defendant's competitors in the theatre business by forcing an increase
in their admission price: "A contract between a copyright owner and one
who has no copyright, restraining the competitive distribution of the copyrighted articles in the open market in order to protect the latter from competition, can no more be valid than a like agreement between two copyright
owners or patentees." 58 Thus we find the Court very much concerned over
the purpose of the arrangement, for in legal effect how does it differ from the
General Electric case? It is to be remembered in that case, the arrangement
between the General Electric Company and Westinghouse constituted a
virtual monopoly in the manufacture of electric light bulbs. Although the
52. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
53. Id. at 227.
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arrangement was designed to protect the patentee (General Electric) in the
development of its patent monopoly, the exclusive nature of it had the effect
of restraining competition in the manufacture of electric light bulbs. Thus, although the result in both the General Electric and Interstate cases was the
same-contrary to the avowed purpose of the Sherman Act-the difference
in holding was attributed to the fact that the primary purpose in the Interstate
case was to protect a licensee, while in the General Electric case, the purpose
was to protect the licensor which brought it under the protection of the patent
monopoly. "Price fixing is usually the essence of that which secures proper
reward to the patentee; it is immaterial how widespread his monopoly may
become, so long as he makes no effort to fasten upon ownership of the
articles he sells control of the prices at which his purchaser shall sell." 54
Suppose X, Y and Z were owners of competing patents and with the
view of entering into a settlement, Y and Z recognized the legality of X's
patent for the right to manufacture and sell the patented article. Would the
arrangement be legal if X alone fixed the resale price of the patented article?
The Supreme Court in United States v. Masonite Corporation 6 answered the
question in the negative. The defendant was the manufacturer and distributor
of hardboard upon which it had a patent. Y commenced manufacturing hardboard and the defendant brought suit for patent infringement. The circuit
court upheld the validity of the defendant's patent and concluded that Y was
liable as an infringer. With a view to terminate further litigation, the defendant
and Y entered into a settlement which resulted in the execution of an agreement establishing Y as the agent of the defendant. The terms of the agreement
provided that the price and conditions of sale of the patented article were to
be fixed by the defendant, that the agent held the hardboard on consignment
with title in the defendant until sold, that the agent's compensation was to be
fixed by way of commission on each sale, that the agent would compensate the
defendant by advancing one-half of the purchase price of the hardboard 20
days after the close of the month in which delivery was made and that the
balance would be paid 20 days after the end of the month in which the product
was sold. The agents further agreed to keep accounts and records of all
transactions with the defendant and to recognize the validity of the defendant's
patent. Similar agreements were made with other manufacturers of building
supplies-some of whom had competing patents. After each agreement was
made, the defendant notified the other agents of its existence; however, each
agent acted independently of the other in executing the agreement. There was
no problem here of an attempt by an agent to impose as a condition of acceptance
that the defendant patentee enter into a like arrangement with others. On the
contrary, as recognized by the district court a successful attempt to duplicate
54. United States v. General Electric Co.. 272 U.S. 476, 493 (1926).
55. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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the arrangement in the General Electric case was made to afford the patentee
the right to establish the price at which the product was sold. In reversing that
holding, the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Douglas declared, "In this
case some of the appellees had patents on hardboard, some did not. But each
was tied to Masonite (patentee) by an agreement which expressly recognized
the validity of Masonite's patents during the life of the agreement and which
required the distribution of the patented product at fixed prices. In the General
Electric case the Court thought that the purpose and effect of the marketing
plan was to secure to the patentee only a reward for his invention. We cannot
agree that that is true here. In this case the price regulation was based on
mutual agreement among distributors of competing products, some of whom
had competing patents. . . .if it were sanctioned in this situation it would
permit th'e patentee to add to his domain at public expense by obtaining command over a competitor. He would enhance the value of his own trade position
by eliminating or impairing competition." 58 This holding reflects the reluctance
of the Court to apply the doctrine announced in the General Electric case for
fear of the adverse effect it would have upon the fundamental purpose of the
anti-trust legislation. This fear became apparent through the use of such statements as-"The power of Masonite (patentee) to fix the price of the product
which it manufactures, and which the entire group sells and with respect to
which all have been and are now actual or potential competitors, is a powerful
inducement to abandon competition." 57 It was regrettable that the Court did
not take the opportunity to reconsider the General Electric doctrine particularly
since it was announced to uphold an arrangement negativing competition between actual competitors-agents of the General Electric Co.-and between
potential competitors--General Electric and Westinghouse. This effect must
have been recognized by the Court in deciding the Masonite case for it emphasized two factors which were not present in the General Electric case to
formulate the justification for the different result. First,the Masonite Corporation, patentee, notified all the agents of each agreement entered into. Second,
some of Masonite's agents had similar patents on hardboard and their
validity was not determined. With respect to the first factor, it gave the arrangement the air of a combination and conspiracy to fix prices; however, the
district court found that Masonite alone fixed the prices and that the agents
had no intention of joining a combination or to fix prices. The Supreme
Court disregarded these findings declaring, "And as respects statements of
various appellees that they did not intend to join a combination or to fix prices,
we need only say that they must be held to have intended the necessary and
direct consequences of their acts. . . .Nor can the fact that Masonite alone

56. Id. at 280.
57. 316 U.S. 265, 281 (1942).
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fixed the prices and that the other appellees never consulted with Masonite
concerning them make the combination any the less illegal." 58
It is difficult to ascertain a valid distinction, for the purpose of upholding
or condemning a combination, between the case where the vending licensees
of a patented article are notified by the patentee of the existence of other
licensees, who have nothing whatsoever to do with them, and the case
where the patentee does not divulge such information. It does make it appear
as though a combination or conspiracy was in existence; however, when the
facts establish to the contrary, the difference in legal effect disappears. With respect to the second factor distinguishing the Masonite case from the General
Electric case the district court found that the patent owned by Masonite was
fundamental and basic and that the licensees exercised an honest intent to
recognize the rights belonging to Masonite. The Supreme Court has never
held that a patent infringer was regarded as a bona fide competitor for to do
so would deny the patentee of the patent grant-the exclusive right to make,
use or vend the invention. Yet, the Court, without going into the question of
the legality of the patents owned by the licensees, held them to be competing
with the one owned by Masonite and to be evidence of a conspiracy to fix prices.
The process of distinguishing the General Electric case from facts warranting the application of the same principle has reflected the concern of the
Supreme Court over the vast economic control which that principle makes
possible. The Masonite case is an example, however; if the General Electric
doctrine carries with it the conviction that it constitutes a valid interpretation of
the extent of the patent monopoly, why hesitate to apply it? If changes in
economic circumstances render it incompatible to the anti-trust laws and an
impediment to their effective enforcement, why not expressly overrule it? The
result of permitting it to stand on the books as a precedent when it has in fact
been overruled has created a great deal of uncertainty which is hampering the
government in launching a successful anti-trust policy and the patentee who
seeks to establish an arrangement protected by the patent monopoly.
If there was any doubt after the Masonite case as to whether the General
Electric doctrine was in fact overruled, it was dispelled in United States v.
Line Material Co.69 The defendant, Southern, was the owner of a patent on a
fuse cutoff which was not commercially acceptable. The defendant, Line,
obtained a patent on an improved type of fuse cutoff which was dominated by
the patent owned by Southern. Thus, in order to produce a commercially accepted device, it was necessary that an agreement be entered into between
Southern and Line. Such an agreement was arrived at and according to the
terms of which Line granted to Southern the right to manufacture and vend
under Line's improved patent and in turn Line obtained the right to make
58. 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
S9. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
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and vend under Southern's dominant patent plus the exclusive right to grant
sublicenses thereunder. This cross license agreement permitted Line to grant
licenses for the manufacture and sale of the improved device under both
patents and to impose conditions as to the maintenance of a fixed selling
price. Six others were sublicensed by Line and agreed to maintain the prices
fixed by Line. The arrangement involved 40% of all competitive cutoffs and
was entered into in good faith. In an action brought by the government to enjoin the defendants from carrying out the conditions as to price maintenance as
violative of the Sherman Act, the trial court held the rule in the General Electric
case to be controlling and the injunction was denied. In reversing the trial
court's holding, the Supreme Court split three ways with three different
opinions being rendered. To grant the injunction, the majority of the Court
had the alternative of either expressly overruling the General Electric case
or of distinguishing it once again. As the holding in the Masonite case would
indicate, the Court with greater reluctance selected the latter course. The theory
of the Court's holding being that in the General Electric case the licensor issued
a price fixing license based solely on his own patents which right was included
in the patent monopoly. On the other hand, in the Line Material case the price
fixing licenses were based not only on the licensor's own patent, but also on the
dominant patent owned by Southern with the alleged result that "The merging
of the benefits of price fixing under the patents restrains trade in violation of
the Sherman Act in the same way as would the fixing of prices between
producers of non-patentable goods." 60 The General Electric case was
ostensibly reaffirmed by use of dictum to the effect that a price fixing agreement between patentee and licensee is a reasonable restraint which accords
with the patent monopoly. Such an arrangement is held distinguishable from
an agreement between cross licensing patentees to fix prices which is beyond
the scope of the patent monopoly and illegal under the Sherman Act. "... When
patentees join in an agreement as here to maintain prices on their several
products, that agreement, however advantageous it may be to stimulate that
broader use of patents, is unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. It is more
than an exploitation of patents. There is the vice that patentees have combined
to fix prices on patented products. It is not the cross licensing to promote
efficient production which is unlawful. There is nothing unlawful in the requirement that a licensee should pay a royalty to compensate the patentee for
the invention and the use of the patent. The unlawful element is the use of
the control that cross licensing gives to fix prices." 61
It is settled that an agreement between patentees to fix prices of competing
non-infringing patented products is unlawful, for in such a case the subject of
the attempted control is in excess of or different from the patent grant of a
60. Id. at 311.
61. 333 U.S. 287, 314 (1948).

PATENTEE'S DILEMMA-IS PRICE FIXING LEGAL?

329

single patentee and falls within the condemnation of the Sherman Act. Similarly, it is settled law that a patentee who has a valid patent on a combination of
unpatented articles cannot use the patent to control the sale of the unpatented
component parts. However, neither of the above settled principles have application in the instant case. Whether the arrangement in the Line case is upheld or
denounced is dependent entirely upon the attitude of the Supreme Court toward
the General Electric case, for according to the principle there laid down, the
price fixing condition imposed in the Line case was precisely coextensive with
the statutory monopoly conferred by the patent grant to Line. The license
entered into between Line and Southern did not impose any price fixing condition or royalty. The only effect of the license was an agreement that Southern would not impede the right of Line to manufacture and sell the patented
article under its own patent where the exercise of that right would infringe
the exclusiveness of Southern's patent right. In short, it constituted nothing
more than a covenant not to sue. The price fixing provision was attached
solely to Line's patent and contrary to the basis for the Court's holding, two
patents were not combined for the purpose of fixing prices. The right of Line
to fix prices under its own patent was neither enlarged nor diminished by the
license agreement with Southern. Thus the legality of the arrangement became
dependent upon the conduct of Line to its licensees which was identical to that
between General Electric and Westinghouse in the General Electric case.
Although the General Electric and Line Material cases justified the application of similar principles of law, the ability of the Court to distinguish them
was made possible by the "rule of reason" which has been held applicable to
price fixing under a valid patent. However, even under this standard of conduct it is certainly illogical to distinguish the cases solely because a patentee's
covenant not to sue was superimposed on a price fixing agreement which was

protected under the patent monopoly. In effect the majority of the Court
overruled the General Electric case but couldn't agree to say so. If there is any
validity attached to the General Electric case today, the servient patent owner
will be permitted to issue licenses on his own patent and to regulate the selling
price of the patented article and the licensees will be permitted to secure
licenses from the dominant patent holder subject to price restrictions. In legal
effect, what is the difference between that type of an arrangement and the one
presented in the Line Material case? The same result is accomplished which
would not be countenanced by the Court, for in denouncing the arrangement
in the Line Material case, the Court reflected great concern over the effect
of the arrangement upon our economy. "Where two or more patentees with
competitive, non-infringing patents combine them and fix prices on all devices
produced under any of the patents, competition is impeded to a greater degree
than where a single patentee fixes prices for his licensees. The struggle for
profit is less acute. Even when, as here, the devices are not commercially com-
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petitive because the subservient patent cannot be practiced without consent of
the dominant, the statement holds good. The stimulus to seek competitive inventions is reduced by the mutually advantageous price fixing arrangement." 62
This statement serves the commendable purpose of revealing the Court's acceptance of economic reality in the laws relating to patents; however, of what
avail is it if adherence to the General Electric doctrine permits the very evils
advised against?
In United States v. United States Gypsum Company 63 the Supreme
Court refused to extend the General Electric rule solely for the reason
that the effect would constitute a nation-wide price fixing scheme. The United
States Gypsum Co., owner of patents on gypsum products, granted licenses
to others in the industry to manufacture and vend the patented articles and
by so doing, has had control of the entire output of gypsum board and 80%
of the plaster and miscellaneous gypsum products manufactured and sold in
the area east of the Rocky Mountains. All the licenses contained a provision
granting the licensor the right to fix minimum prices at which the gypsum
board embodying the patent was to be sold. The licensor and licensees not
only agreed to maintain uniform prices, but took steps to organize the entire
industry, i.e. elimination of a class of distributors, suppression of production
of competitive unpatented products, stabilization of prices on unpatented
products and several others. The district court found that the license agreements entered into by Gypsum were similar to those involved in the General
Electric case and upheld the arrangement. The Supreme Court took the step
which could have been anticipated from the Masonite holding and reversed the
lower court's decision however, on different grounds, In the Masonite .case
the Court held that the patent monopoly became exhausted by transfer of the
articles to the agents. In other words, the transaction was really a sale which
placed the patented article beyond the control of the patentee to impose conditions. In the Gypsum case the Court followed a different line of reasoning
and held that the patent was enlarged and violated the Sherman Act because
the effect of the arrangement was to secure to the patentee rewards coming
from industry wide price maintenance rather than rewards which flow from
the right of exclusion granted by the patent laws. The Court relied heavily
upon the Masonite case and stated some of the dangers inherent in industry
wide price maintenance schemes, i.e. powerful inducement for the abandonment
of competition, cessation of litigation concerning the validity of patents, etc.
In short the Court was determined to denounce the arrangement because of
its widespread effect. Since that consideration appears to be paramount with
the Court today, how can an arrangement like the one presented in the
General Electric case involving 93% of all the electric light bulbs manu62. Id. at 310.
63. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
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factured in the United States be approved? It is to be remembered in that
case the Court stated, "As long as he (patentee) makes no effort to fasten
upon ownership of the articles he sells control of the prices at which his
purchaser shall sell, it makes no difference how widespread his monopoly." 64
(Italics added). The rejection of this reasoning, as evidenced in the Gypsum
case, indicates further that the General Electric case remains a precedent in
name only and the process of distinguishing it from other similar factual situations will continue until the majority of the Court can agree to bury it.
The right of a patentee to impose price restrictions in license agreements
has been subject to animadversion from an early date. As early as 1912, a bill 65
was introduced in Congress forbidding the patentee from controlling the price
at which his patented article is to be sold by others. Many other bills n6 have
been subsequently submitted however, none enacted.
In 1933, when the nation was in the midst of a depression, a clamor for
a more effective anti-trust program was met by the appointment of the Temporary National Economic Committee. This body investigated our economic
structure and with respect to patents recommended in its final report 67 that
a patentee be deprived of the right to fix prices of the patented articles sold by
his licensees. As yet Congress has not acted on the recommendation. It is unlikely that congressional inactivity on the subject will be interpreted as
approval of the present treatment given by the courts, since such acquiescence
would also constitute approval of the confusion resulting from uncertainty. The
uncertainty will be removed and consistency restored only after the long overdue legislative action is taken to define the patent-anti-trust relationship with
a reasonable degree of definitiveness.
64. 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926).
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